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Abstract
Iterative decoders used for decoding low-density parity-check (LDPC) and moderate-density
parity-check (MDPC) codes are not characterized by a deterministic decoding radius and their error
rate performance is usually assessed through intensive Monte Carlo simulations. However, several
applications like code-based cryptography need guaranteed low values of the error rate, which are
infeasible to assess through simulations, thus requiring the development of theoretical models for
the error rate of these codes under iterative decoding. Some models of this type already exist, but
become computationally intractable for parameters of practical interest. Other approaches attempt
at approximating the code ensemble behaviour through assumptions, which however are hardly
verified by a specific code and can barely be tested for very low error rate values. In this paper we
propose a theoretical analysis of the error correction capability of LDPC and MDPC codes under a
single-iteration parallel bit-flipping decoder that does not require any assumption. This allows us to
derive a theoretical bound on the error rate of such a decoding algorithm, which hence results in a
guaranteed error correction capability for any single code. We show an example of application of
the new bound to the context of code-based cryptography, where guaranteed error rates are needed
to achieve some strong security notions.
Index Terms
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is recognized that avoiding short cycles in the Tanner graph representation of the
parity-check matrix of a low-density parity-check (LDPC) code is important, because small
girths have an adverse impact on the error rate performance of iterative decoders [2], [3].
Nevertheless, there are some applications in which the adoption of codes with small girth is
unavoidable. For example, this is the case of the LDPC and moderate-density parity-check
(MDPC) codes used for code-based post-quantum cryptography [4], [5]. In this context,
which is experiencing an increasing interest by the scientific community due to the NIST
standardization initiative of post-quantum cryptosystems [6], the structure of the parity-check
matrix is mainly dictated by security issues. This yields unavoidable cycles of length 6 in
the relevant codes. Moreover, in these systems the sparse parity-check matrix of an LDPC
or MDPC code is used as a secret key, and is hence designed at random, thus often yielding
a large number of cycles of length 4.
Contrary to bounded distance decoders, iterative decoders commonly used for LDPC and
MDPC codes are not characterized by a deterministic decoding radius. This implies the
existence of a residual error rate that is difficult to model theoretically, and is hence usually
assessed through Monte Carlo simulations. Nevertheless, there are applications in which
extremely low error rates are required. One of this cases is again in the area of code-based
cryptography, where error rates as low as 2−80 or less are required to avoid some types of
attacks [7]–[10]. Obviously, such low values of the error rate are infeasible to assess through
numerical simulations.
At the same time, low-complexity iterative decoders are important in many applications
in which high throughputs have to be achieved. The best known decoder of this type is
Gallager’s bit flipping (BF) decoder [11]. Starting from its basic principle, several variants
of BF have been proposed. Among them, in this paper we focus our attention on the so-
called parallel BF. Roughly speaking, the parallel BF algorithm operates as follows. At each
iteration, all parity checks are computed: all bits involved in a number of unsatisfied parity-
check equations overcoming some suitably chosen threshold are flipped, and the syndrome
is accordingly updated. The procedure is iterated, until a null syndrome is obtained or a
maximum number of iterations is reached. Following a more general approach than [12],
3where parallel BF is introduced, we consider a threshold that is not fixed, but rather depends
on some features of the code under consideration.
Based on the above considerations, an important research challenge is represented by the
development of analytical tools able to foresee the number of errors that an iterative decoder
can correct. A vast body of literature exists on this subject [13]–[17], which permits to
determine lower and upper bounds on the guaranteed error correction capability of the code.
Many of these approaches use expander graph based arguments [15], [16], whose application,
however, is known to be NP-hard [18] and can be used for a limited number of cases and under
specific constraints. Moreover, the bounds these methods provide are often loose, particularly
in case of small girths.
In this paper, first we make some considerations on the guaranteed error correction capa-
bility of LDPC and MDPC codes with small girth, which generalize the approach proposed
in [1], [19]. In [19], in particular, a majority-logic decoder is considered and it is shown
that its error correction capability depends on the maximum number of superimpositions
between any two columns of the code parity-check matrix. This allows deriving conditions
under which a single iteration of this decoder corrects all errors up to a given weight. These
results are extended in [1], where a more general decoder is considered and tighter bounds
are derived. We show that such bounds are indeed tight if the girth of the considered codes
is small.
Moreover, we provide an upper bound on the error rate of LDPC and MDPC codes for
the first iteration of BF decoding which, differently from that in [1], does not rely on any
specific assumption. We remark that some lower and upper bounds on the error rate under
BF decoding are also proposed in [20], but their computation requires pre-processing of all
possible initial error patterns with weight up to a certain value; thus, the approach becomes
quickly unfeasible as the error probability of the channel decreases or as error patterns with
too large weight have to be considered. The same remark holds for the approaches proposed
in [21], [22], which allow estimating the error rate of LDPC codes under BF decoding. Our
approach instead is fully analytical, and does not require any preliminary simulation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce the notation used throughout
the paper and recall some basic notions of LDPC and MDPC codes. In Section III we discuss
the error correction capability of codes with small girth under BF decoding. In Section IV we
provide an upper bound on the error rate of LDPC and MDPC codes under BF decoding. In
Section V we show an application of the derived bounds to code-based cryptography. Finally,
we draw some conclusions in Section VI.
4II. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
We use capital letters to denote sets, adopting caligraphic fonts for sets of vectors. The
cardinality of a set A (or A) is denoted as |A| (or |A|). Given a set A, we use a ← A to
express the fact that a is randomly extracted among all the elements of A, and the same
notation is used for sets of vectors. Let ψ be a function with domain A and codomain B;
then, we use ψ(A) to denote the image of ψ ⊆ B.
The binary Galois field is denoted as F2. We use small bold letters to denote vectors, and
capital bold letters to denote matrices. Given a matrix H, its entry at position (i, j) is denoted
as hi,j and its k-th column is denoted as hk. Given a vector e, we refer to its j-th entry as
ej . Given a set A, we have e
(A) = {ei s.t. i ∈ A}. The AND, OR and ex-OR operations are
denoted as ∧, ∨ and ⊕, respectively. The Hamming weight and the support of any vector e
are denoted as wt (e) and S(e), respectively. The set of integers between a and b is denoted
as [a, b]. We denote the set of all binary vectors of length n and Hamming weight m as Bm.
A. LDPC and MDPC codes
A binary LDPC code is the null space of a binary parity-check matrixH containing a small
number of ones compared to the total number of entries. Denoting the code blocklength as n
and the code dimension as k,H has r ≥ n−k rows and n columns. The syndrome of a binary
vector e is defined as s = eH⊤, where ⊤ denotes transposition and the product is performed
over F2. Any codeword belonging to the code defined by H has an all-zero syndrome. The
i-th column and j-th row of H have weight vi and wj , respectively. The code is said to be
(v, w)-regular if each column of H contains exactly v ones and each row contains exactly
w ones. Regular LDPC codes are generally characterized by w = O(logn), whereas regular
MDPC codes are characterized by w = O(
√
n). Regardless of such a distinction, these two
families of codes have quite similar properties and the analysis that will be developed in the
following is equally valid for both of them.
Definition 1 Given a matrix H ∈ Fr×n2 , let hi denote its i-th column; then, the adjacency
matrix of H, denoted as Γ, is the n× n matrix whose element in position (i, j) is such that
γi,j =


|S(hi) ∩ S(hj)| if i 6= j
0 if i = j
.
The adjacency matrix is commonly employed in graph theory: given an undirected multi-
graph with n nodes, the adjacency matrix can be defined as the n×n matrix whose element in
5position (i, j) is equal to the number of edges connecting nodes i and j. Obviously, starting
from a parity-check matrix H, we can construct a graph1 with n nodes, such that the i-th
and the j-th node are connected by |S(hi) ∩ S(hj)| edges.
B. Bit flipping decoding
Let us describe a general version of the parallel BF algorithm focusing on a single iteration.
Decoder inputs are a syndrome s ∈ Fr2 and a vector of integers b = [b0, · · · , bn−1], such that
bi ∈ [1, vi], ∀i. For each i ∈ [0, n − 1], the number of unsatisfied parity-check equations
involving the i-th bit is computed; we denote such a number as σi. The decoder considers
as “error affected” all the bits for which σi ≥ bi and, thus, returns as output a vector e′ with
support S(e′) = {i s.t. σi ≥ bi}. So, bi has the meaning of a decision threshold for the i-th
bit. Decoding is successful if s⊕ e′H⊤ = 0r. An interesting special case considered next is
that in which bi = b, ∀i, which boils down to a majority-logic decoder when b = ⌊v2⌋ + 1.
III. GUARANTEED ERROR CORRECTION CAPABILITY OF BIT FLIPPING
Let us provide some preliminary definitions taken from [1], with some adaptations.
Definition 2 Given H, let us consider the rows of H indexed by S(hi) and put them into a
matrix H(i). Following [1], we define H(i) as the i-th partial parity-check matrix. The j-th
column of H(i) is denoted as h
(i)
j . We also define
δ(i)(H(i), z) = max
M, |M |=z, i 6∈M
{
wt
(⊕
j∈M
h
(i)
j
)}
,
where M is a set containing the indexes of z columns of H(i), except for the i-th. We call
the maximum column intersection of order z, and denote as δ(H, z), the quantity defined as
δ(H, z) = max
0≤i≤n−1
{
δ(i)(H(i), z)
}
.
When z = 1, we call δ(H, 1) the maximum column intersection and, for simplicity, we
denote it as δ; it is easy to see that δ corresponds to the maximum number of set positions
in which two columns of H overlap. We remark that, if the code has girth larger than 4, then
the supports of any two columns intersect in at most one position, thus we have δ = 1.
The above notions can be easily related to the entries of the adjacency matrix. For instance,
the weight of the j-th column of the i-th partial parity-check matrix is equal to the (i, j)-th
1We remark that this graph, which is not bipartite, is different from the Tanner graph [23] of the code.
6element of the matrix Γ, γi,j , and the maximum column intersection corresponds to the largest
entry of Γ. For a code with girth larger than 4, the adjacency matrix is a binary matrix.
Definition 3 Given H and the corresponding adjacency matrix Γ, we denote as γ˜(i) the
vector formed by the elements of the i-th row of Γ, except for the i-th one. We define µ(i)(z)
as the sum of the z largest entries of γ˜(i). We then define the maximum column union of
order z, denoted as γ(H, z), the quantity
γ(H, z) = max
0≤i≤n−1
{
µ(i)(z)
}
. (1)
A. Bounds on the error correction capability
The following theorem from [19] shows that the error correction capability of a code
decoded with a majority-logic decoder is related to the maximum column intersection.
Theorem 1 [19] Consider a code defined by a parity-check matrix for which every column
has weight at least v and whose maximum column intersection is δ. Majority-logic decoding
on this matrix allows the correction of all error vectors with weight t ≤ tM , where tM =
⌊
v
2δ
⌋
.
Corollary 1 Consider a code with g > 4 defined by a parity-check matrix for which every
column has weight at least v∗. Majority-logic decoding on this matrix allows the correction
of all error vectors with weight t ≤ tM , where tM =
⌊
v∗
2
⌋
.
Proof: It is a straightforward consequence of the fact that, if g > 4, the maximum
column intersection is 1.
As mentioned in the Introduction, these results are generalized in [1], where it is shown
that the guaranteed error correction capability under BF decoding can actually be expressed
by taking into account the interplay of more than two columns, that is, assuming z > 1.
Theorem 2 [1] Let us consider a code defined by a parity-check matrix H in which every
column has weight at least v∗. Let t be an integer such that
v∗ > δ(H, t) + δ(H, t− 1).
Then a BF decoder with variable decoding thresholds
bi ∈ [δ(H, t) + 1, vi − δ(H, t− 1)] , ∀i ∈ [0, n− 1], vi ≥ v∗,
(or fixed decoding threshold b ∈ [δ(H, t) + 1, v∗ − δ(H, t− 1)]) corrects all the error vectors
of weight t in one iteration.
7If we denote by tM the largest integer t such that Theorem 2 is satisfied, and assume that
δ(H, i) ≤ δ(H, j), 2 ∀i < j ≤ tM , then Theorem 2 allows correction of all the error vectors
with weight smaller than or equal to tM .
Let us now specialize Theorem 2 to (v, w)-regular codes with girth g > 4. When g > 4,
the weight of the columns of any partial parity-check matrix is either 0 or 1. In particular,
any partial parity-check matrix contains n− (w−1)v all-zero columns and (w−1)v columns
with weight 1. As any partial parity-check matrix has v rows, it follows that
δ(H, z) = z ∀z ≤ v,
which is obtained by considering z different columns. Then, according to Theorem 2, we
have that
tM = max
t
{t s.t. v > t+ t− 1} ,
tM = max
t
{
t s.t. t ≤
⌊v
2
⌋}
,
tM =
⌊v
2
⌋
,
with threshold b =
⌊
v
2
⌋
+ 1 if v is even (corresponding to a majority-logic decoder), and
b ∈ [⌊v
2
⌋
+ 1,
⌈
v
2
⌉
+ 1] if v is odd. In other words, when g > 4, Theorem 1 and Theorem
2 express the same error correction capability, with Theorem 2 giving an additional choice
on the decision threshold when v is odd. When g = 4, instead, as proved in [1], the bound
given in Theorem 2 is never smaller than that given in Theorem 1, which means that the
new bound is tighter.
As discussed above, Theorem 2 guarantees correction of all error vectors up to a given
weight tM only if δ(H, t) is a non-decreasing function for all t ≤ tM . This assumption is
reasonable for sparse parity-check matrices, but it may not be verified for any choice of H;
thus, we state the following theorem, based on the adjacency matrix Γ, which does not rely
on any assumption. Theorem 3 provides an upper bound on the error correction capability
that is smaller than or equal to the one given by Theorem 2, but larger than or equal to the
one given by Theorem 1.
Theorem 3 Let us consider a code defined by a parity-check matrixH in which every column
has weight at least v∗. Let t be an integer ≤ tM , where tM is the largest integer such that
v∗ > γ(H, tM) + γ(H, tM − 1). (2)
2This may be satisfied or not, depending on the structure of H.
8Then a BF decoder with decoding thresholds
bi ∈ [γ(H, t) + 1, vi − γ(H, t− 1)] (3)
corrects all the error vectors of weight smaller than or equal to t in one iteration.
Proof: Let σi denote the number of unsatisfied parity-check equations in which the i-th
bit participates, and vi denote the weight of the i-th column in H. Let us denote by e the
error vector; if ei = 1, then we have
σ
(1)
i = vi − wt

 ⊕
j∈S(e)\i
h
(i)
j


≥ vi −
∑
j∈S(e)\i
γi,j (4)
≥ vi − γ(H, t− 1).
In the same way, when the i-th bit is error free, that is, ei = 0, we have
σ
(0)
i = wt

⊕
j∈S(e)
h
(i)
j


≤
∑
j∈S(e)
γi,j (5)
≤ γ(H, t).
Clearly, one iteration of BF decoding can correct any error vector e of weight t if, ∀i,
there exists a value of bi such that
min
e
{σ(1)i } ≥ bi > max
e
{σ(0)j }, ∀i ∈ S(e), ∀j 6∈ S(e). (6)
Inserting (4) and (5) into (6), we obtain
vi − γ(H, t− 1) ≥ bi > γ(H, t), (7)
which implies
v∗ − γ(H, t− 1) > γ(H, t). (8)
According to (7), any bi ∈ [γ(H, t) + 1, vi − γ(H, t− 1)] guarantees that all bits such that
ej = 0 are characterized by values of σ
(0)
j that never exceed bj and, thus, are not flipped;
oppositely, all bits such that ei = 1 are characterized by values of σ
(1)
i larger than or equal
to bi, and thus are flipped.
9B. Comparison with previous approaches
Let us compare our bounds on the error correction capability with those in [15]. We remark
that our bounds are referred to a single decoding iteration, whereas those in [15] are referred
to an unspecified number of decoding iterations. Despite this, as shown in the following, for
small values of g our bounds are tighter than those in [15].
Theorem 4 [15] For a code defined by a parity-check matrix H with girth g in which every
column has weight v, BF decoding with decoding threshold b =
⌊
v
2
⌋
+ 1 allows correction
of all error patterns of weight less than

1
2
+ v
4
∑k−1
i=0
(
v−2
2
)i
if g = 4k + 2,∑k−1
i=0
(
v−2
2
)i
if g = 4k.
(9)
For g = 4, g = 6 and g = 8, the bounds on the error correction capability computed
according to (9) are 0, ⌈v+2
4
⌉ − 1 and ⌈v
2
⌉ − 1, respectively. So, for g = 4 (9) is useless.
On the contrary, the error correction capability given by Theorem 2 is not null on condition
that δ(H, 0) + δ(H, 1) < v, that is, being δ(H, 0) = 0 by definition, if δ < v. So, contrary
to (9), as long as H does not contain repeated columns, Theorem 2 guarantees a significant
error correction capability, just after one decoding iteration. Several examples are reported in
[1], where it is also shown that even the values resulting from Theorem 3 (that, we remind,
are more conservative than those from Theorem 2) are often significantly larger than those
obtained from Theorem 1.
For g = 6, we have δ = 1 and the error correction capability given by Theorem 2 coincides
with that given by Theorem 3, resulting in tM = ⌊v2⌋ ≥ ⌈v+24 ⌉ − 1. Notice that the previous
inequality, which compares the error correction capability given in Theorem 3 (left hand
side) and that resulting from (9) (right hand side), holds with the equality sign only for
v = 1 and v = 3. To be more explicit, the gap between the correction capability foreseen by
Theorem 2 and that obtained through (9) becomes higher and higher for increasing v, which
is a significant issue in view of the application to code-based cryptography, where v may
assume relatively large values.
For g = 8, Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 result in ⌊v
2
⌋, whereas (9) results in ⌈v
2
⌉ − 1. So,
since ⌊v
2
⌋− (⌈v
2
⌉ − 1) = 1−mod ( v
2
)
, the bounds are the same for odd values of v, whereas
the bound we provide in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 is larger by 1 than that given in (9) for
even values of v.
Finally, for g > 8, the bounds given by (9) are always larger than those given by Theorem
2 and Theorem 3.
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So, based on the above considerations, we can conclude that the major impact of the
present analysis and, similarly, of the analysis in [1], [19], occurs for codes with g = 4 and
g = 6.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DECODING FAILURE PROBABILITY FOR THE FIRST ITERATION OF
BF DECODING
In this section we derive a conservative bound for the decoding failure probability, de-
noted as Pf ,
3 of the first and only iteration of a BF decoder, with decoding thresholds
[b0, b1, · · · , bn−1], applied on a syndrome s = eH⊤, where e ← Bt. Having a fixed number
of errors (t) is a scenario of interest in code-based cryptography, in which encryption is
performed by intentionally corrupting a codeword with a constant number of errors. Nev-
ertheless, once having characterized the decoder performance for a given number of errors,
it is easy to extend such a characterization to channel models (like the binary symmetric
channel (BSC)) in which the statistic of the number of errors is known. In fact, a BSC with
crossover probability ρ can be straightforwardly studied by considering that the probability
that the channel introduces exactly t errors is equal to Pr{wt(e) = t} = (n
t
)
ρt(1−ρ)n−t. So,
denoting the error vector after the first iteration as e′, the decoding failure probability over
the BSC can be computed as
Pf =
n∑
t=0
Pr
{
wt(e′H⊤ ⊕ s) > 0 | wt(e) = t}Pr {wt(e) = t}, (10)
where Pr
{
wt(e′H⊤ ⊕ s) = 0 | wt(e) = t} can be upper bounded through the method we
describe in this section. For the sake of brevity, from now on we only focus on the case in
which t is constant and fixed.
For i ∈ [0, n− 1], we define fi as the binary variable obtained through the following rule
fi =


0 if [(σi < bi) ∧ (ei = 0)] ∨ [(σi ≥ bi) ∧ (ei = 1)],
1 if [(σi ≥ bi) ∧ (ei = 0)] ∨ [(σi < bi) ∧ (ei = 1)].
(11)
In other words, when fi = 0, the decoder takes a right decision on the i-th bit. Conversely,
when fi = 1, the decoder takes a wrong decision on the i-th bit; a wrong decision can either
be the flip of an error-free bit or the missing flip of a bit affected by an error. The error
patterns that cause a decoding error in the i-th position are defined by the so-called error
sets, which we introduce next.
3Notice that the decoding failure probability coincides with the expected value of the frame error rate (FER).
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Definition 4 Let H ∈ Fr×n2 be the parity-check matrix of a code with blocklength n. We
consider the first and only iteration of a BF decoder, with decoding thresholds [b0, · · · , bn−1].
Let fi be the binary variable defined as in (11), for i ∈ [0;n− 1]. Then, for z ∈ {0, 1}, we
define the error set for the i-th bit as follows
Ezi,t,bi = {e ∈ Bt s.t. fi = 1| ei = z} .
As we show in the following, a fundamental quantity in establishing the error correction
capability of the first iteration of a BF decoder is represented by the cardinality of the error
sets; to this end, in order to ease the notation, we define the following quantity.
Definition 5 Let Pl,m = {p0, · · · , pm−1} be a set of distinct integers 0 ≤ pi < l, with l ≥ m
and pi 6= pj , ∀i, j. We define Pl,m as the ensemble containing all such distinct non-ordered
sets; clearly, |Pl,m| =
(
l
m
)
. Let α ∈ N and let a ∈ Nl be a length-l vector of non-negative
integers; then, we define
N am,α =
{
Pl,m ∈ Pl,m s.t.
m−1∑
i=0
api > α
}
.
Additionally, we define φ as the bijective function that maps each vector in Fn2 into its
support. For m ∈ [0, n−1], we have φ (Bm) = Pn,m and φ provides an isomorphism between
Bm and Pn,m. As we show in the next sections, the cardinality of such sets is fundamental
for our analysis; a naive approach would require to test
(
l
m
)
subsets, which clearly is not
feasible when the values of l and m are non-trivial and significantly different one each
other. By exploiting the fact that, for the cases we consider, the integer values are all non-
negative and rather small, we can devise an approach with reduced complexity, as described
in Appendix A.
A. Decoding failure probability analysis based on the error sets
Let us introduce a property of the error sets that will then be used to derive the main result
reported in Theorem 5.
Lemma 1 Let H ∈ Fr×n2 be a parity-check matrix, and let Ezi,t,bi , for z ∈ {0, 1}, be the error
set for the i-th bit. We denote with γ˜(i) the vector formed by the entries of the i-th row of
the adjacency matrix Γ, defined in Section II, except for the i-th one. Then, we have
∣∣E1i,t,bi∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣N γ˜(i)t−1,vi−bi
∣∣∣ , (12)
∣∣E0i,t,bi∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣N γ˜(i)t,bi−1
∣∣∣ . (13)
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Proof: We focus on the i-th bit, and derive the conditions upon which the decoder takes
a wrong decision (i.e., fi = 1). We first consider the case of ei = 1: a wrong decision is
taken if σi < bi. Then, a necessary but not sufficient condition for having fi = 1 can be
derived from (4) as
∑
j∈S(e)\i γi,j > vi − bi. We have
E1i,t,bi ⊆

e ∈ Bt s.t. (ei = 1) ∧

 ∑
j∈S(e)\i
γi,j > vi − bi




=
{
e ∈ Bt s.t. (ei = 1) ∧
(
[S(e) \ i] ∈ N γ˜(i)t−1,vi−bi
)}
= φ−1
(
N γ˜(i)t−1,vi−bi
)
,
from which ∣∣E1i,t,bi∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣N γ˜(i)t−1,vi−bi
∣∣∣ .
Similarly, for the case of ei = 0, we can derive from (5) that a necessary but not sufficient
condition for fi = 1 is bi ≤ σi ≤
∑
j∈S(e) γi,j . Then, we have
E0i,t,bi ⊆

e ∈ Bt s.t. (ei = 0) ∧

 ∑
j∈S(e)
γi,j > bi − 1




= φ−1
(
N γ˜(i)t,bi−1
)
,
from which ∣∣E0i,t,bi∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣N γ˜(i)t,bi−1
∣∣∣ . (14)
Based on these relationships, we can now prove the following main theorem.
Theorem 5 Let H ∈ Fr×n2 be a parity-check matrix. Let e ∈ Bt, and s = eHT be the
corresponding syndrome. We consider a single BF iteration applied on s, with decoding
threshold for the i-th bit denoted as bi. Let γ˜
(i) denote the vector formed by the elements in
the i-th row of Γ, except for the i-th one. The probability that the decoder fails to decode s
is upper bounded as follows
Pf ≤ min

1;
∑n−1
i=0
(
|N γ˜(i)t−1,vi−bi|+ |N γ˜
(i)
t,bi−1
|
)
(
n
t
)

 . (15)
Proof: Let Ei,t,bi be the set of all error vectors such that fi = 1; clearly
Ei,t,bi = E0i,t,bi ∪ E1i,t,bi.
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By considering that E1i,t,bi and E0i,t,bi are disjoint, as a bit may be either correct or incorrect,
and by taking into account (12) and (13), we obtain
|Ei,t,bi| =
∣∣E0i,t,bi∣∣+ ∣∣E1i,t,bi∣∣
≤
∣∣∣N γ˜(i)t−1,vi−bi
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣N γ˜(i)t,bi−1
∣∣∣ . (16)
Then, the probability that decoding of s = eHT fails can be upper bounded by means of the
following chain of inequalities
Pf =
∣∣⋃n−1
i=0 Ei,t,bi
∣∣
|Bt|
≤
∑n−1
i=0 |Ei,t,bi|
|Bt|
≤
∑n−1
i=0
(∣∣∣N γ˜(i)t−1,vi−bi
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣N γ˜(i)t,bi
∣∣∣)
|Bt| . (17)
The thesis of the theorem is finally proved by considering that |Bt| =
(
n
t
)
and that trivially
Pf ≤ 1 (whereas the bound in (17) is not guaranteed to be smaller than or equal to 1).
The expression of Pf derived above is coherent with the results given in Section III-A
and, in particular, in Theorem 3. Indeed, the following corollary holds.
Corollary 2 Let us suppose that t ≤ tM , where tM is the largest integer such that (2) holds.
If the decoding threshold is chosen as follows
bi ∈ [γ(H, t) + 1, vi − γ(H, t− 1)] , ∀i, (18)
then
∣∣∣N γ˜(i)t−1,vi−bi
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣N γ˜(i)t,bi
∣∣∣ = 0, ∀i and, consequently, Pf = 0.
Proof: By definition,
∣∣∣N γ˜(i)t−1,vi−bi
∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
{
Pn,t−1 ∈ Pn,t−1 s.t.
t−2∑
i=0
γ˜
(i)
pi
> vi − bi
}∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
{
Pn,t−1 ∈ Pn,t−1 s.t. bi > vi −
t−2∑
i=0
γ˜
(i)
pi
}∣∣∣∣∣ .
However, it follows from the definition of γ(H, t− 1) and from (18) that
bi ≤ vi − γ(H, t− 1) ≤ vi −
t−2∑
i=0
γ˜
(i)
pi
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for any choice of the indexes pi and, thus,
∣∣∣N γ˜(i)t−1,vi−bi
∣∣∣ = 0. Similarly, we have
∣∣∣N γ˜(i)t,bi−1
∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
{
Pn,t ∈ Pn,t s.t.
t−1∑
i=0
γ˜
(i)
pi
> bi − 1
}∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
{
Pn,t−1 ∈ Pn,t−1 s.t. bi <
t−1∑
i=0
γ˜
(i)
pi
+ 1
}∣∣∣∣∣ .
It also follows from (18) that
bi ≥ γ(H, t) + 1 ≥
t−1∑
i=0
γ˜
(i)
pi
+ 1
for any choice of the indexes pi, and thus
∣∣∣N γ˜(i)t,bi−1
∣∣∣ = 0. Finally, the fact that Pf = 0 is a
straightforward consequence of (15).
In the particular case of regular codes, which implies to have equal decoding threshold
values, noted as b, assuming v is odd and b =
⌈
v
2
⌉
, the bound on Pf provided by Theorem
5 can be rewritten as
Pf ≤ min

1;
∑n−1
i=0
∣∣∣N γ(i)
t, v−1
2
∣∣∣(
n
t
)

 . (19)
The proof is reported in Appendix B.
Equation (19) can be used for any regular code with g ≥ 4. For regular codes with g ≥ 6,
however, (19) can be further elaborated as discussed next.
B. Regular codes with girth larger than 4
When g ≥ 6, we have
γi,j ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, j. (20)
In particular, for (v, w)-regular codes, each row and each column of Γ contain exactly v(w−1)
non-zero entries. The following lemma holds.
Lemma 2 Let a ∈ Fl2 be a vector of weight m; then, we have
∣∣N ax,α∣∣ = θ(l, x,m, α), with
θ(l, x,m, α) =


0 if α > m or x ≤ α∑min{m,x}
j=α+1
(
m
j
)(
l−m
x−j
)
otherwise
. (21)
The following Theorem 6 specializes Theorem 5 to the case of a regular code with girth
larger than 4, and reformulates (19) for such a case.
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Theorem 6 Let H ∈ Fr×n2 be the parity-check matrix of a (v, w)-regular code with girth
g ≥ 6. Let e ∈ Bt, and s = eH⊤. We consider a single iteration of BF decoding applied to
s, with a unique decoding threshold b. If v is odd and b =
⌈
v
2
⌉
, we have

Pf = 0 if t ≤ v−12
Pf ≤ min
{
1;
nθ(n,t,v(w−1), v−1
2
)
(nt)
}
otherwise
, (22)
where
θ(n, t, v(w − 1), v − 1
2
) =
min{v(w−1),t}∑
j= v+1
2
(
v(w − 1)
j
)(
n− v(w − 1)
t− j
)
.
Proof: The proof is quite similar to that of Theorem 5, and its specialization to the case
of regular codes (reported in Appendix B), by taking into account Lemma 2.
We remark that, if the code has girth larger than 6, (19) is not expected to be tight, as
additional constraints, which we do not investigate in this paper, should be taken into account
for its validity.
In the next section we apply these results to the case of code-based cryptosystems using
LDPC and MDPC codes that have g = 4 or g = 6.
V. APPLICATION TO CODES USED FOR CRYPTOGRAPHY
There is a recent trend in post-quantum cryptography to make use of some special classes of
quasi-cyclic low-density parity-check (QC-LDPC) and quasi-cyclic moderate-density parity-
check (QC-MDPC) codes [4], [5], [24], since they enable the design of McEliece cryptosys-
tem variants with very small public keys. By considering the quasi-cyclic (QC) nature of these
codes, which are described by parity-check matrices made of circulant blocks, the bounds
introduced in the previous section can be further specialized. It can be easy verified that, for
these codes, the matrix Γ is QC as well; this property can be exploited to further speed-up
the computation of the error sets required to calculate the bounds.
Let us consider the case of QC-LDPC code defined by the following parity-check matrix:
H =
[
H0 H1
]
, (23)
where each Hi, i ∈ {0, 1}, is a circulant matrix of size p and row/column weight v. The
following well-known result holds.
Lemma 3 Any circulant matrix with weight larger than 2 has girth g ≤ 6.
Proof: The proof is omitted for brevity. See [25, Lemma 4.2].
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It follows from Lemma 3 that a parity-check matrix as in (23) cannot have girth larger
than 6.
In this case, the matrix Γ can be written as
Γ =

Γ0,0 Γ0,1
Γ1,0 Γ1,1

 , (24)
where each Γi,j is a p × p matrix; in particular, Γ is symmetric, and this means that Γ0,0
and Γ1,1 are symmetric as well, while Γ
⊤
0,1 = Γ1,0. Moreover, each block Γi,j is circulant.
In particular, let γ(i) be the i-th row of Γ; then, all rows γ(j) such that ⌊i/p⌋ = ⌊j/p⌋ are
identical up to a quasi-cyclic shift; this means that
∣∣Ezi,t,b∣∣ = ∣∣Ezj,t,b∣∣ , ∀b, t, ∀i, j s.t. ⌊i/p⌋ = ⌊j/p⌋ , (25)
with z ∈ {0, 1}. Then, from Theorem 5 we obtain
Pf ≤ min
{
1; p
Ntot(
n
t
)
}
, (26)
with
Ntot =
∣∣∣N γ˜(0)t−1,v−b∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣N γ˜(0)t,b−1∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣N γ˜(p)t−1,v−b∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣N γ˜(p)t,b−1∣∣∣ .
We remark that, in code-based cryptography, a decoding failure yields a decryption failure;
thus, the FER coincides with the so-called decryption failure rate (DFR).
In order to assess the accuracy of our bound, let us consider some codes defined by parity-
check matrices as in (23). The first code we consider has p = 9581, v = 25 and g = 4; the
second code has p = 8779, v = 9 and girth g = 6. We assess the decoding failure probability
achieved by a single-iteration BF decoder with different threshold values through Monte
Carlo simulations; for each value of t, the failure probability has been estimated through the
observation of 100 wrong decoding instances. The comparison of the simulation results with
our bounds is shown in Figs. 1 and 2, respectively. From the figures it results that the bound
becomes tighter and tighter for decreasing values of Pf .
Actually, the values of Pf that are required for the mentioned cryptographic systems to
achieve reasonably large security levels are much smaller than those plotted in Figs. 1 and 2,
and impossible to assess through Monte Carlo simulations. This makes the derived bounds
particularly useful in this case. In fact, we can use (26) to design code parameters able to
achieve the desired small values of Pf without needing any simulation. To show an example,
let us consider the case of a security level of 280 binary operations, for which QC-MDPC codes
with v ≥ 45 and t ≥ 84 are needed [5]. The matrices proposed in [5] have p = 4801, which
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P f
Fig. 1. Comparison of the decoding failure probability estimated through Monte Carlo simulation with our bound for a
code with p = 9581, v = 25, g = 4, and different threshold values.
P f
Fig. 2. Comparison of the decoding failure probability estimated through Monte Carlo simulation with our bound, for a
code with p = 8779, v = 13, g = 6, and different threshold values.
however leads to a decoding failure probability too large to resist reaction attacks like that
proposed in [26] and achieve the desirable security condition known as indistinguishability
under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) [27]. A decoding failure probability
lower than 2−80 is instead required for such a purpose.
The bound provided by (26) instead allows achieving such a requirement through a classic
rejection sampling approach: for each randomly generated parity-check matrix in the form
(23), the bound (26) is computed and the matrix discarded if such a value is above the target
Pf . The procedure is repeated until a matrix with the desired property is obtained. In order
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to verify the feasibility of such an approach, let us consider different parameter sets and, for
each set, generate 1, 000 parity-check matrices at random and compute the Pf bound through
(26). The choice of b is optimized by choosing the value of b for which the bound takes its
smallest value.
The results of this experiment are reported in Table I. We notice that, for all tested
parameter sets, a significant percentage of matrices satisfies the constraint Pf < 2
−80. This
fact guarantees that the time required to generate a valid matrix is limited. In other words,
it is not difficult to find a matrix for which we can be sure that the desired security level is
reached.
We point out that, despite the codes obtained through the above approach are significantly
larger than those originally proposed, they still lead to public key sizes that are smaller than
those of other competing cryptosystems, while achieving IND-CCA. For instance, considering
binary Goppa codes as in the original McEliece cryptosystem, the public key size equals
460, 647 bits [28] for 80 bits security, while the parameters we found lead to a reduction in
the public key size by a factor ranging between 1.64 and 3.57. Additionally, the parameter sets
we propose represent a concrete worst case estimate of the key size increase which is needed
in order to ensure IND-CCA. Indeed, we obviously expect that if more than one decoding
iteration is performed, the minimum value of p which is necessary to fulfill Pf < 2
−80
decreases, thus further reducing the key size and allowing more significant improvements
with respect to other cryptosystems. However, extending the bound to the case of multiple
iterations goes beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future works.
TABLE I
REJECTION SAMPLING RATIOS FOR DIFFERENT PARAMETER SETS
p v Keys achieving Pf < 2
−80
279,991 45 158 out of 1,000
194,989 65 990 out of 1,000
160,499 75 792 out of 1,000
149,993 85 971 out of 1,000
138,389 95 847 out of 1,000
130,043 105 226 out of 1,000
VI. CONCLUSION
We have studied the error correction capability of LDPC codes under iterative decod-
ing with the aim of finding theoretical models for its characterization without resorting to
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computation-intensive simulations.
Under the simplifying assumption of a single-iteration BF decoder, we have shown that
a per-code upper bound on the error rate can indeed be found. Such a bound provides an
important theoretical tool in those contexts where very small error rates have to be guaranteed
per each specific code.
One of these contexts is that of code-based cryptography, and we have shown how our
bound can be succesfully applied to such a context, allowing the design of cryptosystems
based on QC-LDPC and QC-MDPC codes able to achieve strong security notions while
keeping the size of the public keys smaller than that of classic systems employing algebraic
codes and bounded-distance decoders.
APPENDIX A
In this Appendix we describe an efficient way to compute the cardinalities of the sets
introduced in Definition 5. To this end, we first formalize the problem and then describe
a method that, for the cases we are interested in, significantly improves upon the naive
exhaustive search approach.
Problem 1 Let a ∈ Nl be a length-l vector of non negative integers, and let B ⊆ [0; l − 1]
be a set of size m ≤ l. Given α ∈ N, α > 0, compute
NB =
∣∣∣∣∣
{
B ⊆ [0; l − 1], |B| = m s.t.
∑
i∈B
ai > α
}∣∣∣∣∣ .
It is clear that an exhaustive search would require to generate all subsets of size m: thus, the
corresponding complexity will be equal to
(
l
m
)
. As we show with combinatorial arguments,
a simple algorithm can be devised, with a complexity that may be significantly lower.
In particular, we obtain the number of the sets that are complementary to those defined in
Problem 1, that is
N¯B =
∣∣∣∣∣
{
B ⊆ [0; l − 1], |B| = m s.t.
∑
i∈B
aj ≤ α
}∣∣∣∣∣ ,
from which the value of NB can be straightforwardly obtained as
NB =
(
l
m
)
− N¯B. (27)
For a set B, we denote with a(B) the vector formed by the entries of a that are indexed by
B; we define N¯
(j)
B as the number of subsets B for which the corresponding sub-vector a
(B)
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contains m elements, j of which are distinct, whose sum is smaller than or equal to α. We
have
N¯B =
l∑
j=1
N¯
(j)
B . (28)
The values of N¯
(j)
B can be easily obtained, as we show next.
First of all, let ω be the number of distinct values in a, with Y = {y0, y1, · · · , yω−1} being
the set of such values in ascending order. In the same way, we define λu = |{i s.t. ai = yu}|.
As we show below, the computation of N¯B depends only on these quantities.
Let YB be the set of distinct values that are contained in a
(B). When j = 1, we easily have
N¯
(1)
B =
∑
0≤i≤ω−1 : yi≤⌊ αm⌋
(
λi
m
)
, (29)
where, as usual,
(
λi
m
)
= 0 if m > λi. When j > 1, some further considerations must be taken
into account. For a set B, let yi0, yi1, · · · , yij−1 be the distinct values assumed by the entries
of a(B), and denote the corresponding multiplicities as m0, m1, · · · , mj−1. If B ∈ N¯ (j)B , we
must have
j−1∑
u=0
muyiu ≤ α. (30)
We clearly have m =
∑j−1
u=0mu, from which we obtain m0 = m−
∑j−1
u=1mu; then, (30) can
be rewritten as
myi0 +
j−1∑
u=1
mu(yiu − yi0) ≤ α. (31)
It is obvious that
myi0 +
j−1∑
u=1
mu(yiu − yi0) ≥ myi0 +
j−1∑
u=1
(yiu − yi0). (32)
The above condition can be turned into the following criterion: a set B associated to the
values yi0, yi1, · · · , yij−1 of a(B), whose sum is smaller than or equal to α, exists if and only
if
j−1∑
u=1
yiu − yi0 ≤ α−myi0 . (33)
Let us now fix an index q ∈ [1; j − 2], and suppose that we are looking at all sets B such
that a(B) contains the values yi0, · · · , yiq−1 with respective multiplicities m1, m2, · · · , mq−1.
Then, imposing teh constraint and summing over all subsets, we obtain
α ≥ myi0+
q−1∑
u=1
mu(yiu − yi0) +mq(yiq − yi0) +
j−1∑
z=q+1
mz(yiz − yi0)
≥ myi0 +
q−1∑
u=1
mu(yiu − yi0) +mq(yiq − yi0) +
j−1∑
z=q+1
(yiz − yi0).
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Then, the maximum value for mq is obtained as
m(max)q = min
{
λq,
⌊
α−myi0 −
∑q−1
u=1mu(yiu − yi0)−
∑j−1
z=q+1(yiz − yi0)
yiq − yi0
⌋}
. (34)
Finally, N¯
(j)
B can be computed as
N¯
(j)
B =
ω−j∑
i0=0
ω−j+1∑
i1=i0+1
· · ·
ω−1∑
ij−1=ij−2+1
d(i0, · · · , ij−1), (35)
where
d(i0, · · · , ij−1) =


0 if
∑j−1
u=1 yiu − yi0 > α−myi0∑m(max)1
m1=1 · · ·
∑m(max)
j−1
mj−1=1
( λi0
m−
∑j−1
i=1 mi
)∏j−1
u=1
(
λiu
mu
)
otherwise
, (36)
where, coherently with (29),
( λi0
m−
∑j−1
i=1 mi
)
= 0 if λi0 < m−
∑j−1
i=1 mi.
We point out that, when a contains a small number of distinct elements (i.e., ω ≪ l), this
approach becomes significantly faster than the exhaustive search on all subsets. Indeed, first
of all we clearly have N¯
(j)
B = 0 when j > ω; moreover, the number of configurations tested
by using (36) is surely smaller than mj−1. Then, for a specific value of j, the computation
of N¯
(j)
B requires to test no more than m
j−1
(
ω
j
)
configurations. Thus, we can roughly upper
bound the total number of configurations that are considered as
ω∑
j=1
mj−1
(
ω
j
)
≤
ω∑
j=1
mj−1
(
ωe
j
)j
≤ ωmω−1eω, (37)
where e is the basis of the natural logarithmic. It can be verified that, when m,w ≪ l, the
above upper bound is significantly smaller than
(
l
m
)
.
APPENDIX B
In this Appendix we consider the case of regular codes, for which the decoding threshold
values can be assumed constant and equal to b, and we demonstrate that when v is odd and
b =
⌈
v
2
⌉
, the bound (15) can be reformulated as in (19).
Let H be the parity-check matrix of a (v, w)-regular code with blocklength n and odd
v. Let us denote as γ(i) the i-th row of the adjacency matrix Γ. Moreover, let e ∈ Bt, and
s = eH⊤. We consider a single iteration of BF decoding applied to s, with a unique decoding
threshold
⌈
v
2
⌉
.
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In order to determine a bound for Pf in these conditions, we can basically repeat the steps
in the proof of Theorem 5. In this case, however, (16) can be specialized as follows∣∣∣Ei,t,⌈v2⌉
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣E1
i,t−1,v−⌈ v2⌉ ∪ E
0
i,t,⌈v2⌉−1
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣E1i,t−1, v−1
2
∪ E0
i,t, v−1
2
∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣N γ˜(i)
t−1, v−1
2
∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣N γ˜(i)
t, v−1
2
∣∣∣ , (38)
where we have exploited the fact that, since v is odd, we have
⌈
v
2
⌉
= v+1
2
. Now, if we
consider γ(i) and a set S ∈ N γ(i)
t, v−1
2
, we have only two possibilities.
1) If i ∈ S, since γi,i = 0, we have
∑
j∈S\i γi,j >
v−1
2
, from which {S \ i} ∈ N γ˜(i)
t−1, v−1
2
.
2) If i 6∈ S, we have ∑j∈S γi,j > v−12 , from which S ∈ N γ˜(i)t, v−1
2
.
Then, we can state ∣∣∣N γ˜(i)
t−1, v−1
2
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣N γ˜(i)
t, v−1
2
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣N γ(i)
t, v−1
2
∣∣∣ . (39)
By replacing this equality in (15), the simpler (19) is eventually obtained.
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